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CONTRACT COLLISIONS:
AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE
ON CONTRACTUAL NETWORKS
MARC AMSTUTZ*
I
INTRODUCTION
The anthropocentric bias inherent in our culture also informs our
understanding of law. Because of this, we often have difficulty imagining that
new schemata for dealing with unresolved legal conundrums may emerge in
practice without conscious human effort. In the minds of jurists, a script (in the
1
classic Goffman sense ) has become ingrained, according to which a legal
concept is first invented by a legal scholar, then promoted by a political figure
or tested in court by a (usually somewhat audacious) lawyer, and then enacted
by lawmakers or applied by judges, at which point it becomes a fixture in legal
practice—until such time as a new inventive spirit comes up with a better
2
concept and the process repeats itself from the beginning. In short, law is
3
usually considered to be the product of human intention and planning.
But who was it that devised the notion of the contract, or of legal
personality, or of property? The traditional understanding of legal concepts fails
to account for what could be called the “idiopathic” manner in which law
evolves, and underestimates the creative force behind it. Legal evolution is a
communicative process that takes place at a level of emergence detached from
4
that of individual experience.
This blindness to the existence of gradual evolutionary processes in the
development of law is certainly more marked in Continental Europe than it is in
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1. See ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF
EXPERIENCE (1974).
2. For the classic portrayal, see ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF WESTERN PRIVATE LAW
(2d ed. 2001). For a similar take, embellished with more modern theoretical elements, see MANFRED
ASCHKE, KOMMUNIKATION, KOORDINATION UND SOZIALES SYSTEM: THEORETISCHE
GRUNDLAGEN FÜR DIE ERKLÄRUNG DER EVOLUTION VON KULTUR UND GESELLSCHAFT 315–17
(2002).
3. For a fundamental critique of this conception, see FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, “DIE
ERGEBNISSE MENSCHLICHEN HANDELNS, ABER NICHT MENSCHLICHEN ENTWURFS,” FREIBURGER
STUDIEN: GESAMMELTE AUFSÄTZE 97 (2d ed. 1994).
4. See Marc Amstutz, Widerstreitende Götter: Zu Manfred Aschkes Rekonstruktion der
systemsoziologischen
Evolutionstheorie
und
ihrer
rechtstheoretischen
Bedeutung,
2
RECHTSGESCHICHTE 14 (2003).
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common law countries. Civil law jurisprudence is traditionally much less
receptive to the notion of legal innovation through changing judicial
precedent—the conventional practice of Anglo-American common law. This is
unfortunate, because the solutions found in court judgments, though designed
only for the settlement of specific conflicts in individual cases, often conceal
within them, at a deeper, more abstract level, the seeds of legal paradigms
that—if for no other reason than the means by which they came into being—
offer considerable promise of being particularly suitable to existing social
conditions.
In this article, I would like to demonstrate the plausibility of this thesis with
the example of a judgment by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 115 BGE II
5
452. Although this judgment did not attract a great deal of attention at the time
6
it was published, it nevertheless represents a particularly telling example of
what may be termed “communicative” case law. In this judgment, social
undercurrents come to expression (though admittedly still clouded in some
obscurity) that are acting to compel the law of contracts to increasingly take
7
into account the heterarchic or network logic of contractual relationships
(regardless of whether they are referred to as “combined contracts” or “legal
consortiums,” or as “contractual webs,” “contractual networks,” or groupes de
8
contrats). If I am correct in my reading of this judgment, it may even be said
that 115 BGE II 452 contains within it the fragments of a model for a law of
contractual nexus.

5.

Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Nov. 7, 1989, 115 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES
[BGE] II 452 (Switz.) [hereinafter 115 BGE II 452].
6. As far as I am aware, the judgment has not been analyzed in any legal journal since its
publication. For the only discussions of the judgment that go beyond a simple mention in passing, see
Bruno Cocchi, Die Kündigung der Dienstwohnung, 2 MIETPRAXIS 52 (1995); Raymond Bisang, Fragen
im Zusammenhang mit gemischten Verträgen mit mietrechtlichem Einschlag, 17 MIETRECHTPRAXIS 239
(2010).
.
7 For the concepts of heterarchy and network in legal scholarship, see Gunther Teubner, “And if
I by Beelzebub Cast out Devils, . . .”: An Essay on the Diabolics of Network Failure, 10 GERMAN L. J.
395 (2009). For a description of these concepts, see Satoshi Miura, Heterarchy, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
GOVERNANCE 267 (Mark Bevir ed., 2007) (“A governance mechanism that is neither hierarchy nor
market (anarchy) is usually called a network. It is described as horizontal and nonhierarchical, but its
basic organizing principle can more positively and appropriately be called heterarchy. Etymologically
speaking, heterarchy consists of the Greek words heteros, the other, and archein, to rule. In a
heterarchy, a unit can rule, or be ruled by, others depending on circumstances, and hence, no one unit
dominates the rest.”). For the significance of these concepts in social sciences, see Carole L. Crumley,
Heterarchy and the Analysis of Complex Societies, 7 ARCHEOLOGICAL PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION 3 (1995) (“While hierarchy undoubtedly characterizes power
relations in some societies, it is equally true that coalitions, federations, and other examples of shared
or counterpoised power abound. The addition of the term heterarchy to the vocabulary of power
relations reminds us that forms of order exist that are not exclusively hierarchical and that interactive
elements in complex systems need not be permanently ranked relative to one another.”).
8. These are, without exception, contractual affiliations that arise without a “coupling
agreement,” that is, without an accord between the parties. Cases in which there is an explicit coupling
agreement are not included in the present considerations.
SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS
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II
VARIATION IN LEGAL EVOLUTION: DISTORTING JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS
The matter to be decided in 115 BGE II 452 related to the contractual
9
affiliation that had been created bilaterally between the operating company of
the clinic, clinic Y, and the physician, Dr. X. On May 6, 1983, the parties
finalized a so-called collaboration agreement that defined the terms for the use
of the clinic’s facilities by Dr. X for his private patients. The agreement was for
an indefinite length of time, with a six-month period of notice for termination
(Article 5 of the agreement). Less than one year later, on April 1, 1984, the
same parties signed a lease, under which the premises within the clinic building
were let to Dr. X to be used for the operation of his own (private) medical
practice. This agreement was also not limited in time. The termination clause
referred only to the relevant terms of the collaboration agreement, stipulating
that the “period of notice fixed in Article 5 of the collaboration agreement
dated May 6, 1983” was to apply.
On January 3, 1989, clinic Y gave notice of termination, based on the
collaboration agreement, and demanded that Dr. X vacate the premises of his
medical practice inside the clinic by no later than July 7, 1989. Dr. X. then
applied to the court, based on Article 267a of the Code of Obligations (CO)
then in force (Article 272 of the current CO), for an order extending the lease
to the end of 1990. The application was denied both by the court of first
10
instance and in a first appeal. In a direct appeal to the Federal Supreme
11
Court, the operative part of lower court’s decision was again upheld.
Significantly, however, the reasoning of the first instance ruling was not
confirmed.
The lower courts had, in principle, simply chosen the path of least
resistance, treating the agreements in casu not as two separate contracts, but as
a single (hybrid) contract. This construction made it possible for the courts
12
(based presumably on the doctrine of absorption ) to avoid taking into
consideration the provisions of former Article 267a of the CO (CO Article
13
272), on the argument that the collaborative elements of that single agreement
9. For a typological overview of the various types of contractual links, see Marc Amstutz, Ariane
Morin & Walter R. Schluep, Einleitung vor Art. 184 ff. OR, in BASLER KOMMENTAR:
OBLIGATIONENRECHT ART 1–529 OR (Heinrich Honsell et al. eds., 5th ed. 2011) [hereinafter Vor Art.
184].
10. The statement of facts in the judgment reads, with regard hereto, that the lower court denied
“as a matter of principle that the plaintiff had a right thereto based on CO art. 267 . . . but nevertheless
extended the lease until 31 October 1989.” A more detailed description of the lower courts reasoning is
not available. 115 BGE II 453 (“dem Grundsatz nach einen Anspruch des Klägers aus Art. 267a OR
[verneinte], . . . das Mietverhältnis aber dennoch bis zum 31. Oktober 1989 [erstreckte]”).
11. For a more complete account of the facts, see 115 BGE II 453.
12. See Vor Art. 184, supra note 9, at N17.
13. The current CO Article 272 reads as follows: “The tenant may request the extension of a fixedterm or open-ended lease where termination of the lease would cause a degree of hardship for him or
his family that cannot be justified by the interests of the landlord. When weighing the respective
interests, the competent authority has particular regard to: a. the circumstances in which the lease was

11_AMSTUTZ_BP (DO NOT DELETE)

172

8/16/2013 10:52 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 76:169

predominated and therefore took precedence over the “added” elements of the
lease. Because the legal effects of the lease were “absorbed” by those of the
collaboration agreement, the statutory provisions governing leases could be
14
disregarded.
The Federal Supreme Court, however, found “a plurality of contracts,”
consisting of two independent agreements, presumably in view of the fact that
there had not been an exchange of a single concordant intention between the
15
parties. The Court first noted that the question at issue was therefore “whether
a right of use based not simply on a lease, but rather . . . on a nexus of
agreements, by which the lease is affiliated with other contracts,” was also
subject to a right of extension. As this issue had not received a “general
16
response from the legislator,” the Court then looked to the doctrinal literature
for direction—without success, however, as discussion there was limited to the
question of hybrid contracts and saw the right of extension as being contingent
upon the primary focus of the agreement (Regelungsschwerpunkt), on the one
17
hand, and upon a “weighing of the interests” in casu, on the other. Left thus to
fend for itself, the Court’s response was nothing short of spectacular. Without
stating its rationale, the Court ruled that the doctrinal view on hybrid
agreements must also apply in the case of compounded agreements:
Here, too, the right to an extension of the lease must be disallowed where the contract
to which it is linked is primarily determinant for the legal relationship between the
parties and the grant of use of the leased premises appears to be no more than a
subordinated, ancillary agreement. Hence, in each individual case, an examination
must be made of the significance the parties attributed to the individual linked
contracts for the construction of their legal relationship, and of the nature of the
dependency that exists between those contracts in terms of their legal and economic
18
significance

At first glance, these remarks could create the impression that the Federal
Supreme Court had resolved the issue by simply applying the absorption
doctrine analogously. Such a conclusion, however, would be methodologically
19
unsound and does not adequately represent the underlying ratio of 115 BGE II
contracted and the terms of the lease; b. the duration of the lease; c. the personal, family and financial
circumstances of the parties, as well as their conduct; d. any need that the landlord might have to use
the premises for himself, his family members or his in-laws and the urgency of such need; e. the
conditions prevailing on the local market for residential and commercial premises. Where the tenant
requests a second extension, the competent authority must also consider whether the tenant has done
everything that might reasonably be expected of him to mitigate the hardship caused by the notice of
termination.”
14. 115 BGE II 453.
15. This is not expressly stated anywhere in the statement of the Court’s considerations. In
explicating the specific features of hybrid contracts, however, the Court notes that the existence of such
a contract must be presumed, among other things, due to the “absence of a unified act of reaching an
accord.” 115 BGE II 454 E. 3.a.
16. Id.
17. See id. For a different legal approach of this issue, see Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme
Court] 2005, 131 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] III 532–33.
18. 115 BGE II 454 E. 3.a.
19. See discussion infra Part IV.
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452. For one thing, the absorption doctrine makes sense only in cases where a
nominate contract contains individual elements that—although they may be
foreign to such contracts—do not change the essential nature of the contract
such that it can no longer be classed as a nominate contract of a specific type. In
cases of truly hybrid contracts, whose nature is such that they no longer fit the
predefined criteria of any nominate contract, application of the absorption
doctrine leads to their undifferentiated, arbitrary type qualification, in a manner
that is fully at odds with the specific economy of interests for which individual
20
hybrid contracts are designed. This being the case, the reasoning of the
Federal Supreme Court cannot be understood as having been developed along
21
22
such lines. The “material similarity” demanded by prevailing legal opinion in
order to justify an analogous application of the absorption doctrine simply does
not exist between nominate contracts into which foreign elements have been
integrated (for which the doctrine was developed) and linked, independent
contracts. In fact, the linkage of contracts never leaves the economy of those
23
contracts unaltered. The ratio decidendi on which 115 BGE II 452 depends
must thus be sought elsewhere.
Perhaps, as intimated above, the primary source of this ratio is not to be
sought in the decipherment of known jurisprudential riddles. Perhaps it is
rather a reaction by the legal system to changes in the structure of society,
changes that traditional theories of contract—taking, as they do, the atomized
relationships of classic liberal community as their point of departure—are not
designed to deal with. If that is the case, then the rationale that underlies 115
BGE II 452 will be discovered not by working through the existing inventory of
contractual doctrine, but rather by investigating the sociological circumstances
that have given rise to tensions that the law of contracts is unable to resolve.
The following will attempt to illuminate the underlying rationale of 115
BGE II 452 in two steps. To use Luhmann’s terms, it is intended that an external
description of the legal system of contracts will have an influence on its internal
24
description. With this in mind, the discussion will begin with a description of
20. Vor Art 184, supra note 9, at N17.
21. This assessment is confirmed by the more recent case law of the Court. For an in-depth
analysis of this case law, see Marc Amstutz, The Constitution of Contractual Networks, in NETWORKS:
LEGAL ISSUES OF MULTILATERAL CO-OPERATION 320 (Marc Amstutz & Gunther Teubner eds.,
2009).
22. KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 318 (6th ed. 1991).
23. Christian Kirchner, Unternehmensorganisation und Vertragsnetz: Überlegungen zu den
Rechtlichen Bedingungen bei der Institutionenwahl Zwischen Unternehmensorganisation und
Vertragsnetz, in ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE DES UNTERNEHMENSRECHTS: BEITRÄGE ZUM 3.
TRAVEMÜNDER SYMPOSIUM ZUR ÖKONOMISCHEN ANALYSE DES RECHTS 196–215 (Claus Ott &
Hans-Bernd Schäfer eds., 1993).
24. NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT 496–97 (1993). For an illustration of the
way in which a coupling of the description of the legal system by outside observers with the system’s
own self-description is conceivable from an internal perspective, see Marc Amstutz, Historizismus im
Wirtschaftsrecht: Überlegungen zu Einer Evolutorischen Rechtsmethodik, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR JEAN
NICOLAS DRUEY ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 9–29 (Rainer J. Schweizer et al. eds., 2002). See also Marc
Amstutz, Der Text des Gesetzes: Genealogie und Evolution von Art. 1 ZGB, in ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
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the contemporary “society” that constitutes the environment in which the law
of contracts operates, that is, the social layers with which that law must come to
terms—a description limited, of course, to the selective observations of a legal
sociological perspective, one that is thus without any ambition of providing an
exhaustive understanding of this inexhaustible subject. By this means (through
the observation of outside description), some initial insights should become
available for providing an answer to the dilemma of finding a mechanism to
enable contract law to deal adequately with the phenomenon of networks. On
this foundation (as a form of “externally influenced” self-description), a reading
of 115 BGE II 452 will be proposed through which isolated characteristics of a
model for applying the law to linked contracts will be revealed. At the core of
this second step lies, above all, the question as to the extent to which the
identifiable elements of that model can find general application.
III
SELECTION IN LEGAL EVOLUTION: LAW AND SOCIETY INTERACTING
In its searching over the past decades, contract law has consistently oriented
itself on the memory of past hopes—as expressed, for example, in von
25
Gierke’s utopian vision of private law “with foundations deep enough and
arches high enough” to embrace even social concerns “in the structure of its
26
thought.” That was a consequence of the effects of social forces that had taken
shape in the shadow of the “great transformation” of economically oriented
society (Wirtschaftsgesellschaft), which have served as a restraint on the
27
constant expansion of the market in certain directions.
This
“supplementation” of traditional notions of private law has, however, been only
piecemeal and has not fully succeeded in keeping pace with the social
realignments that have taken place since Savigny’s day. The measure of this
“supplementation’s” success was largely determined by the extent to which the
interplay of social forces allowed certain expectations or demands to be
articulated, to find a place on the political agenda, and to garner support in the
28
legislature or judiciary. The development of contract law stagnated at a level
defined by sociological concepts from the 19th century, when, in reaction to the
SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT 237 (Helbing et. al. eds., 2007); Marc Amstutz, Ex facto ius oritur:
Überlegungen zum Ursprungsparadox des Rechts, 13 SOZIALE SYSTEME 243 (2007); Marc Amstutz,
Ouroboros: Nachbemerkungen zum Pragmatischen Methodenpluralismus, in MÉLANGES EN
L’HONNEUR DE PIERRE TERCIER 19–32 (Peter Gauch et al. eds., 2008).
25. See OTTO VON GIERKE, DIE SOZIALE AUFGABE DES PRIVATRECHTS 17 (Erik Wolf ed., 2d
ed. 1948); GEORGES GURVITCH, L’IDEE DU DROIT SOCIAL: NOTION ET SYSTEME DU DROIT SOCIAL.
HISTOIRE DOCTRINALE DEPUIS LE XVIIE SIECLE JUSQU’A LA FIN DU XIXE SIECLE 535–67 (1932).
26. See PEER ZUMBANSEN, ORDNUNGSMUSTER IM MODERNEN WOHLFAHRTSSTAAT:
LERNERFAHRUNGEN ZWISCHEN STAAT, GESELLSCHAFT UND VERTRAG 209 (2d ed. 2000).
27. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS
OF OUR TIME (1st ed. 1957).
28. Compare with the overview by Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Wandlungen des
SchuldvertragsrechtsTendenzen zu Seiner “Materialisierung,” 200 ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE
PRAXIS 273 (2000) regarding German law.
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“social crisis” of the time, the dark side of modernity and its toll on the
individual took center stage: social stratification and inequality, the loss of
29
community, alienation, anomie, and so on.
The law of contracts has, to date, taken only scant notice of the
30
phenomenon of social differentiation. The reference here is to the process,
specific to modernity, of structuring society by drawing boundaries between
various social functions, each of which is performed according to its own
individual logic. Activities in the individual domains of social life are no longer
seen as interrelatedeconomic activity detached from religious, familial, and
political values, taking its orientation exclusively from the “cash nexus”: politics
is reduced to the acquisition of power; science interests itself only for scientific
31
truth; the arts only for artistic beauty, et cetera. Attempts to substantively
describe the nature of the society we live in—as an “industrial society,” an
“affluent society,” a “knowledge society,” or a “risk society,” for example—
only serve to underscore its highly differentiated disjointedness. As Schimank
has noted, a paradoxical situation has arisen in which “the identity of modern
32
society consists in its non-identifiability” —in other words, reality as poly33
contexturality.
The various discourses conducted by society have splintered off from each
34
other, each developing its own perspective and individual notion of rationality.
Every real event thus takes on a plurality of significant meanings, with the sense
of each dependent upon the context of the discourses into which it is
35
incorporated. To take the example provided by Schimank, a train crash has no
sooner occurred than it becomes a legal, economic, mass media, scientific,
technical, medical, and—depending on the circumstances—possibly also an
educational, or artistic event, the true essence of which lies in the eyes of the
36
various beholders. This fragmentation has consequences that make themselves
felt in all domains, including, quite directly, in the law of contracts.
29. See UWE SCHIMANK, THEORIEN GESELLSCHAFTLICHER DIFFERENZIERUNG 10 (3d ed.
2007).
30. For information about the fundamental treatment of this issue see Gunther Teubner, In the
Blind Spot: The Hybridization of Contract, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 51 (2006). See also
BJÖRN THIES, CO-GRUPPEN-DEMOKRATIE: VORÜBERLEGUNGEN UND SKIZZE ZU EINER
INSTITUTIONELLEN DEMOKRATISIERUNG MODERNER GESELLSCHAFTEN 71 (2012); GUNTER
RUNKEL, ALLGEMEINE SOZIOLOGIE: DIE KLASSIKER, IHRE GESELLSCHAFTSTHEORIEN UND EINE
NEUE SOZIOLOGISCHE SYNTHESE 151 (2012).
31. See Rudolf Stichweh, Zum Verhältnis von Differenzierungstheorie und Ungleichheitsforschung:
Am Beispiel der Systemtheorie der Exklusion, in DIFFERENZIERUNG UND SOZIALE UNGLEICHHEIT:
DIE ZWEI SOZIOLOGIEN UND IHRE VERKNÜPFUNG 353–66 (Thomas Schwinn ed., 1st ed. 2004).
32. See Schimank, supra note 29, at 181.
33. GOTTHARD GÜNTHER, BEITRÄGE ZUR GRUNDLEGUNG EINER OPERATIONSFÄHIGEN
DIALEKTIK: VOL. 2: WIRKLICHKEIT ALS POLY-KONTEXTURALITÄT 283 (1979).
34. See Detlef Horster, Luhmann und die Nächste Gesellschaft, in ZUKUNFTSGENESE: THEORIEN
DES ZUKÜNFTIGEN WANDELS 107–27 (Victor Tiberius ed., 2012).
35. See MICHAEL BEETZ, GESELLSCHAFTSTHEORIE ZWISCHEN AUTOLOGIE UND ONTOLOGIE:
REFLEXIONEN ÜBER ORT UND GEGENSTAND DER SOZIOLOGIE 98–100 (2010).
36. See Schimank, supra note 29, at 179.
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The relationship that exists between the various discourses is not one of
peaceful coexistence:
At issue is not merely a contest between value orientations; in the current perception
of the clash of discourses, the ‘battle of the gods’ has taken on self-destructive
features . . . . The discourses are so hermetically sealed off from each other, that they
are mutually denied any right to be heard, so that they can only do each other
37
‘injustice.’

Interactions between the individual subsystems of society are characterized
38
by mutual intransparency : they share no common language and are, in
39
consequence, mutually incomprehensible. Under these circumstances, it is
clear that the law of contracts suffers a drastic loss of social underpinnings: the
operative closure of the individual subsystems and the multiplication of
individual rationalities rob the extracontractual bases on which contracts are
40
built—as identified by Durkheim —of their relevance, at least insofar as any
attempt is made to link the various discourses together by means of the
contract.
How then is the ability of contracts to function assured? Here, one can
follow Teubner in relying on an understanding of the contract as a form of
“interdiscursivity.” In this view, the contract is seen as functioning as a
reciprocal translation of discourses, in the sense that its consummation depends
on a “productive misunderstanding”:
One discourse can reconstruct the meaning of another only within its own context, but
it can, simultaneously, render the meaning content of that other discourse useful as an
external perturbation, in order to create something new. In this sense, the contractual
translation fundamentally misunderstands the meaning of the contract within the
other discourse and by that very means creates its added value. Through the
contractual translation, each of these languages is capable of reconstructively
41
misunderstanding the other and occasionally to put that misunderstanding to use.

37. See Gunther Teubner, Altera Pars Audiatur: Law in the Collision of Discourses, in LAW,
SOCIETY AND ECONOMY 149, 155, (Richard Rawlings ed., 1997) (“This is no longer a competition
between different value systems; in the contemporary view of discourse collisions the ‘warring gods’
have assumed almost self-destructive proportions. According to Lyotard discourses are so hermetically
closed that they deny each other the right to be heard and only do ‘violence’, ‘tort’, ‘injustice’ to one
another.”). See also Gregor Bongaerts, Grenzsicherung in Sozialen Feldern: Ein Beitrag zu Bourdieus
DIFFERENZIERUNG:
Theorie
Gesellschaftlicher
Differenzierung,
in
SOZIALE
HANDLUNGSTHEORETISCHE ZUGÄNGE IN DER DISKUSSION 113–33 (Thomas Schwinn et al. eds., 1st
ed. 2011).
38. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, POLITICAL THEORY IN THE WELFARE STATE 51–52 (1990)
(“[D]ifferentiation [of society’s system] always means that a plurality of subsystems [for example,
economy, law, and politics], that cannot reciprocally observe and calculate one another exactly and with
certainty, is created within the system. . . . No subsystem can explain the actual state of affairs of the
others any further. It has to be satisfied with black-box observations.”).
39. See JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE DIFFEREND: PHRASES IN DISPUTE (1983) (arguing that
any dispute in society is, as a matter of principle, unable to be settled since each party is caught in its
own language game that is incomprehensible for the others.).
40. See EMILE DURKHEIM, DE LA DIVISION DU TRAVAIL SOCIAL 184 (2007) (1893).
41. See Gunther Teubner, Contracting Worlds: The Many Autonomies of Private Law, 9 SOC. & L.
STUD. 399, 408 (2000) (“In this sense, contractual translation basically misunderstands the meaning of
the agreement in the other discourse and thus creates something new. Via the contractual translation
each of these languages is able to distort and misunderstand the other language and from time to time

11_AMSTUTZ_BP (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2013]

8/16/2013 10:52 AM

CONTRACT COLLISIONS

177

I would like to provide further support for this approach by adding to it an
element that incorporates general sociological observations on the modes of
social integration in a differentiated society, which has the advantage of making
the legal sociological singularity of contractual links recognizable. Given that
differentiation leads to unresolved problems that are hardly exclusive to the law
of contracts (as a subsystem of the legal system), the question can be posed in
42
more general terms: What is it that holds society together at all? In a
functionally differentiated society, that is, a society “without a top and without a
43
center,” there is no central authority responsible for overall coordination, no
“meaningful integrative meta-level overspanning the differentiation of the sub44
systems.”
In modern sociology it is assumed that social integration is achieved today,
above all, through the structural coupling of social systems and the recursive
processes that make it possible. To explain briefly: the term “structural
coupling” is used to denote observation schemata internal to a given system
that are designed to “attach an informational value to events in the [system’s]
environment so that they may serve as a stimulus for further operations by the
45
system itself.” Through these schemata, each system is able to take into
account the autonomy and operative closure of the other subsystems it coexists
with, by learning to conceive of itself as a system operating in an environment
46
comprised of other systems. It does this by taking certain problems of
relevance to its cosystems, whose resolutions are of value for the system’s own
self-description, as a reference for its own internal information processing
operations. The capacity of the system both to identify itself and to orient itself
by this means is termed “reflection.” This capacity is of an integrative nature in
the sense that the “system must control its effects on the environment by
47
checking their repercussions upon itself.” To illustrate with an example,
If it becomes clear within the scientific system that the functionality of other social
subsystems—such as the economic system—depends upon the scientific system’s
receptivity to non-scientific criteria of utility, and that this is also, on the other hand,
of importance to the scientific system itself, since its own supply of financial resources
is also crucially affected by public tax revenues, which are, in turn correlated with
economic growth: it is then possible that the scientific system will arrive at a point
where its production of knowledge is more strongly oriented towards economic
performance references . . . . Such an increase in the consideration given to extra-

make productive use of the distortion and the misunderstanding.”).
42. As an introduction to the question, see Aschke, supra note 3, at 1–15.
43. See Luhmann, supra note 38, at 16.
44. See Schimank, supra note 29, at 181.
45. See Aschke, supra note 3, at 78 (“Ereignisse in der Umwelt [eines Systems] mit
Informationswert zu versehen und zum Anlaß für weitere eigene Operationen zu machen.”).
46. See NIKLAS LUHMANN, AUSDIFFERENZIERUNG DES RECHTS: BEITRÄGE ZUR
RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE UND RECHTSTHEORIE 440 (1981) (“Die Identität eines Teilsystems lässt sich
dann nur noch mit Bezug auf eine Sonderfunktion begründen, die das System für die Gesellschaft im
ganzen erfüllt.”).
47. NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS 475 (Timothy Lenoir & Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht eds.,
1995).
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scientific criteria would be rational for the scientific system, since its own ability to
function is ultimately contingent upon the ability 48
of its social environment, that is, of
the other relevant sub-systems, to function as well.

What is the effect of this redefinition of social integration as a function of
systemic reflection on the law of contracts in a fragmented society? Does it
provide us with any insights for a more adequate understanding of the singular
nature of hybrid contracts? In order to answer these questions, it is first
necessary to analyze the institution of contract from the point of view of social
49
differentiation theory. From a systems theoretical perspective, as has been
adopted for the present argument, a contract is not a consensual act between
two or more actorsit is a structural coupling between a society’s functional
50
systems—economic, legal, scientific, et cetera. This underscores the fact that
contracts make it possible for the implicated systems to describe and observe
51
each other with reciprocal effect. Contracts are able to perform this function
because, as a form of structural coupling, they are a repository of possibilities
upon which the implicated systems can draw for information.

48. See Schimank, supra note 29, at 191 (“Wenn . . . innerhalb des Wissenschaftssystems deutlich
wird,
daß
die
Funktionsfähigkeit
anderer
gesellschaftlicher
Teilsystemeetwa
des
Wirtschaftssystemsdavon abhängt, daß wissenschaftliche Forschung sich stärker auf
außerwissenschaftliche Nutzenkriterien einläßt, und daß dies wiederum also für das
Wissenschaftssystem selbst von Bedeutung ist, weil seine Versorgung mit finanziellen Ressourcen also
mit dem staatlichen Steueraufkommen steht und fällt, das mit dem Wirtschaftswachstum korreliert:
Dann könnte das Wissenschaftssystem dahin gelangen, seine Erkenntnisproduktion stärker auf den
Leistungsbezug zur Wirtschaft auszurichten. . . . [E]ine solche größere Rücksichtnahme auf
außerwissenschaftliche Kriterien [wäre] für das Wissenschaftssystem rational, weil dessen
Funktionsfähigkeit schließlich von der Funktionsfähigkeit seiner gesellschaftlichen Umwelt, also der
relevanten anderen Teilsysteme abhängig ist.”).
49. Some scholars undertake this analysis from a purely legal standpoint. See, e.g., Mathias
Habersack, § 358: Verbundene Verträge, in MÜNCHNER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH: BAND 2: SCHULDRECHT – ALLGEMEINER TEIL (§§ 241–432) N26 (Wolfgang Krüger
ed., 6th ed. 2012); Markus Artz, Grundzüge des Verbundenen Geschäfts, 4 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS
JURISTISCHE STUDIUM 368 (2008); see also 136 BGE III 70. Such attempts are not very helpful and do
not contribute in any way to the understanding of contractual networks. See, e.g., GUNTHER TEUBNER,
NETWORKS AS CONNECTED CONTRACTS (2011) (drawing an identical conclusion); Stefan
Grundmann, Die Dogmatik der Vertragsnetze, 207 ARCHIV FÜR CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 718, 765
(2007); MICHAEL HUNE, WIRTSCHAFTLICHE UND RECHTLICHE DIMENSIONEN EINER MODERNEN
VERTRAGSVERBINDUNG ZWISCHEN WETTBEWERB UND KOOPERATION 39 (2010); see also Jean
Nicolas Druey, The Path to the LawThe Difficult Legal Access of Networks, in NETWORKS: LEGAL
ISSUES OF MULTILATERAL CO-OPERATION 87 (Marc Amstutz & Gunther Teubner eds., 2009). A
more differentiated approach is practiced in French and English jurisprudence. See, e.g., Carole Aubert
de Vincelles, Réflexions sur les Ensembles Contractuels: un Droit en Devenir, 47 REVUE DE CONTRATS
983 (2007); Roger Brownsword, Network Contracts Revisited, in NETWORKS: LEGAL ISSUES OF
MULTILATERAL CO-OPERATION, supra note 21, at 31. For a comparative law perspective, see Fabrizio
Cafaggi, Contractual Networks and the Small Business Act: Towards European Principles?, 493 (EUI
Working Paper Law No. 2008/15, 2008).
50. Compare Luhmann, supra note 24, at 440, with Gralf-Peter Calliess, Das Tetralemma des
Rechts: Zur Möglichkeit einer Selbstbeschränkung des Kommunikationssystems Recht, 21 ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 293 (2000), DAN WIELSCH, FREIHEIT UND FUNKTION: ZUR STRUKTURUND THEORIEGESCHICHTE DES RECHTS DER WIRTSCHAFTSGESELLSCHAFT 56–9 (2001), and
Zumbansen, supra note 26, at 206.
51. See Zumbansen, supra note 26, at 206.
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Luhmann emphasizes the point that, seen in this way, “structural coupling
has, on the one hand, an exclusionary effect—the system is of no consequence
in this domain—while, on the other hand, it gives rise to causalities that the
52
system can make use of.” And how is the information obtained from a contract
put to use by the various systems? As has already been aptly noted, this
information is “constitutive for social systems in the sense that it . . . transforms
latent expectations into concrete obligations, mere projections into operational
53
links.” Put differently, the information generates, within the functional systems
in question, the structures of a subsystem, which push “in the direction of
54
achieving the contractual purpose.” And in this, the fragmentation of the
contract’s effects in the context of social differentiation becomes apparent: via
the contract, there arises in each of the implicated systems an autonomous
discourse, each of which takes on a different form in keeping with the internal
logic of the domain to which it belongs. Thus, for example, within the economic
system, a contract may lead to a commercial transaction as an orderly means of
disposing of property; within the legal system, that same contract gives rise to a
55
normative discourse that treats the contract as a “process;” in other functional
systems (scientific, cultural, medical, educational, et cetera) it provides the
impetus for a project, whose communicative execution leads to a change in the
productive output of that system (knowledge gain, added aesthetic value,
generalized health improvements, enhancement of social and professional
56
competence, et cetera). And all of this occurs simultaneously.
57
It is in this social multi-dimensionality of contracts that the key to a
fundamental understanding of the connectivity that is created through the
affiliation of legal transactions lies. Existing attempts to articulate this
relationship, while highly evocative, do not go beyond what are essentially
intuitive metaphors, speaking, for example, of the “intrinsic bond” or “internal
58
connection” that exists between unified contracts, or of the “ultimate nexus”

52. NIKLAS LUHMANN, EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE SYSTEMTHEORIE 121 (Dirk Becker ed., 5th ed.
2009).
53. Teubner, supra note 41, at 407 (“Contract is constitutive for a discourse in so far as it
transforms latent expectations into actual obligations, changes mere projections into binding
promises.”).
54. Id.
55. See Birger P. Priddat, Märkte, Verträge, Netzwerke: KompossibilitätÜber die Diffusion von
Rationalität im Transaktionsfeld (Discussion paper Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft Universität
Witten/Herdecke, Nov. 7, 2010), http://www.uni-wh.de/fileadmin/media/w/w_forschung/discussion_
papers/7-2010Priddat_dicussionpaper.pdf.
56. For a detailed discussion, see Teubner, supra note 41, at 407 (“If a medical operation needs to
be carried out, an engineering project to be executed, a complex service to be performed, the
contractual relation actualizes this potential and transforms it into a firm promise, an obligation and an
actual performance.”).
57. Teubner, supra note 30, at 51–55.
58. See Joachim Gernhuber, Austausch und Kredit im Rechtsgeschäftlichen Verbund: Zur Lehre
von den Vertragsverbindungen, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KARL LARENZ ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 455, 472
(Gotthard Paulus et al. eds., 1973). See also Ernst Kramer, Art. 19-22 OR, in BERNER KOMMENTAR:
DAS OBLIGATIONENRECHT, BD. VI / 1. ABT. / 2. TEILBD. / UNTERTEILBD. 1A: INHALT DES
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59

created by an affiliation of contracts, or again of the “identité d’objet” or the
60
61
“communauté de cause,” of “multilateral synallagma” or “innominate
62
63
constructions,” and so forth. By contrast, the differentiation theory approach
proposed here makes clear the way in which such contracts contribute to the
emergence of independent discourses in the functional systems of society—
discourses that are in no way obliged to remain at the level of simple
64
interactions, but can evolve to a degree of complexity that compels them to
develop reflective capacities, to coalesce, in other words, into reflective
65
subsystems.
This is most easily conceivable in the case of long-term contracts—franchise
agreements, just-in-time agreements, joint ventures, large construction projects,
technology transfer agreements, for example—where the relationships between
the parties are relieved of the subject-matter and time limitations of spot
transactions and assume the features characteristic of long-term cooperation
arrangements. With that, the (sub)systems that emerge out of the structural
coupling—in the form of a contract—begin to observe their environment, and
to reflect it. This enables them, in particular, to anticipate possible conflicts
between themselves and the systems that make up their environment. Such
potential conflicts are analyzed, through the process of reflection, in terms of
their consequences for the respective (sub)system and induce the internal
correctives needed to avoid them. It is these systemic operations that form the
essence of the connectivity created through the linkage of contracts.
Where multiple contracts provoke multiple discourses, in the subsystems for
which they provide the link, each of which develops its own complexity, then it
is possible that those discourses will begin to observe each other and to
integrate each other into their own reflective processes. It was just such a
reflective interloop that appears to have been generated between the discourses
VERTRAGES N 64 (Arthur Meier-Hayoz eds., 1991); ROMEO CERUTTI, DER UNTERVERTRAG 6
(1990).
59. See Gernhuber, supra note 58, at 461. See also JOACHIM GERNHUBER, DAS
SCHULDVERHÄLTNIS: BEGRÜNDUNG UND ÄNDERUNG PFLICHTEN UND STRUKTUREN,
DRITTWIRKUNGEN 710 (1989).
60. BERNARD TEYSSIE, LES GROUPES DE CONTRATS 295 (1975); see also FRANÇOIS CHAIX, LE
CONTRAT DE SOUS-TRAITANCE EN DROIT SUISSE: LIMITES DU PRINCIPE DE LA RELATIVITE DES
CONVENTIONS 47 (1995).
61. See PETER W. HEERMANN, DRITTFINANZIERTE ERWERBSGESCHÄFTE: ENTWICKLUNG DER
RECHTSFIGUR DES TRILATERALEN SYNALLAGMAS AUF DER GRUNDLAGE DEUTSCHER UND U.S.AMERIKANISCHER RECHTSENTWICKLUNGEN 138 (1998); see also Peter W. Heermann, Ringtausch,
Tauschringe und Multilaterales Bartering, 4 JURISTENZEITUNG 183 (1999); Peter W. Heermann,
Verbundene Geschäfte im Sinne des § 9 Abs. 1 VerbrKrG, 200 ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS
1 (2000).
62. Cf. Amstutz, Morin & Schluep, supra note 9, at N11, with Bisang, supra note 6, at 239.
63. In this context, see also Cordula Heldt, Internal Relations and Semi-spontaneous Order: The
Case of Franchising and Construction Contracts, in: NETWORKS: LEGAL ISSUES OF MULTILATERAL
CO-OPERATION 138 (Marc Amstutz & Gunther Teubner eds., 2009).
64. For more on this concept, see HELMUT WILLKE, SYSTEMTHEORIE I: GRUNDLAGEN 68 (7th
ed. 2007).
65. See id. at 96.
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that arose out of the contracts in question in 115 BGE II 452. The discourses
that arose in the health system and in the economic system, both founded on
the collaboration agreement on the one hand, and on the lease on the other,
attempted to adapt their operations to the approaching crisis (termination of
the two agreements between the doctor and the clinic). This then led to a new
conflict—the extension of the lease—which was unable to be resolved by the
means at the systems’ disposal and thus necessitated the intervention of the
66
legal system.
Seen in this way, it is evident that the reflective interloop does not appear as
such on the legal system’s monitor, but only as something that can be expressed
in legal terms—that is, as a combination of contracts. In other words, the law
reconstructs the reciprocal reflective processes going on between the discourses
in other social subsystems, each of whose discourses was set in motion by a
different contract, as the subject matter of a single, hybrid contract (and
specifically not as interlooped reflective operations, which are of significance
only to legal sociologists and not to legal practitioners). This manner of
analyzing the situation provides a far more precise understanding of what is
actually going on, of the legal reality, one might say, when multiple contracts
are interconnected with each other.
The contractual networkas a reflexive Tower of Babelobscures the
origins of conflicts that arise within its compass, in the sense that it is no longer
possible to identify the contract according to the statutory rules governing how
a given conflict is to be resolved. Each of the discourses set in motion by the
respective contracts observes the conflict from its own perspective and
incorporates itas construed according to its own logicinto its own decision
making calculus. Because of this, the contract is “present,” as it were, in each of
the implicated discourses, for which the legal system creates a situation of
disarray and which is unable to deal with in that form. The legal system is no
longer able to determine with sufficient precision whether a given conflict is to
be interpreted within the context of contract A or contract B. It then attempts
to resolve this dilemma by finding the existence a “contractual nexus”
(Vertragsverbindung), which, aside from giving a name to the problem, does
little in the way of providing a solution. Ultimately, it is the same problem that
private international law constantly faces, the sole difference being that the
matter at hand is not plurinational in nature but “pluricontractual.” The
fundamental legal issue, however, is the same: under which statutory rules is the
legal question posed by the facts of the case to be judged? That is to say, under
which national legal regime, for questions of private international law, or
according to the rules governing which contract, in a contractual network, is the
matter to be decided? Contrary to the impression that such terms as “hybrid
contract” or “affiliation,” and so on, may create, what is at issue is not, in fact,

66. See supra Part II.
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an “amalgamation” or “merger” or anything of that nature, but something quite
the opposite: it is a conflict between two contracts, a contract collision.
Here again, 115 BGE II 452 may serve as a source for material to illustrate
the phenomenon. What was unclear, from a legal point of view, was the
question whether, due precisely to the fact that a connection existed between
the contracts, the extinction of the right to use premises within the clinic
building was to be resolved according to the statutory rules governing the
collaboration agreement or of those governing the lease. One could, at first
glance, be tempted to understand the contractual link in casu as being of a sort
that creates a linkage between two statutory contractual regimesthat is, as
resulting from the reference in the lease to the termination clause in the
collaboration agreement, which would then constitute, in essence, a third
67
agreement in the nature of a “contractual coupling agreement.” Such an
analysis, however, lacks logical precision. For it must be recalled that the
parties, in reality, had no say with regard to the applicability of former Article
68
267a of the CO (CO Article 272), which is a mandatory rule, not a default rule.
As a result, the validity of the coupling agreement was not an issue, since its
effect as a contractual term would still not have been sufficient to override the
statutory right to an extension of the lease. Rather, the sole question to be
resolved was whether the “power of attraction”the magnetic field, as it
wereof the collaboration agreement was sufficiently powerful to suppress the
effects of the other agreement’s status as a lease and thus to render the
mandatory former Article 267a of the CO (CO Article 272) inapplicable with
regard to the conditions for the termination of the lease. In other words, the
issue in 115 BGE II 452 was, in point of fact, a classic case of a collision of
contracts.
IV
STABILIZATION IN LEGAL EVOLUTION: EMERGING CASE LAW
If one accepts this view of the legal reality behind 115 BGE II 452, then it
follows that that ruling also signals the emergence of a new norm—obviously,
not yet fully formed—for dealing with the collision of contracts. This represents
a step forward in contract law doctrine, in particular, because it opens the way
for a theoretical analysis of the ratio decidendi using a paradigm that has thus
far been widely ignored. The fundamental question relates to the logic of the
normative structure that underlies the collision of contracts, the norm
(implicitly) applied by the Federal Supreme Court.
In attempting to answer this question, a useful point of departure may be
found in theories of private international law, which have by now become
highly developed and for which the construction of such norms has for many
67. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
68. See Peter Higi, Art. 271-274g OR, in KOMMENTAR ZUM SCHWEIZERISCHEN
ZIVILGESETZBUCH: OBLIGATIONENRECHT, TEILBD. V / 2B: DIE MIETE, ZURICH: SCHULTHESS N 12
(Peter Gauch & Jörg Schmid eds., 1996).
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years been an important focus of study. It is generally assumed today that a
conflict of laws norm comprises three elements. First, there is the matter for
referral, that is, the abstract legal question for which an answer is sought.
Second, there must be a term of reference, that is, a statement of the criterion
according to which the respective conflict of laws norm decides that one statute
or another is to be applied. And lastly, the determination of the lex causae, that
is, the determination as to which statutes may be held to govern the question
69
named as the matter for referral, pursuant to the norm.
By applying the logic of this normative structure to the collision norm that
appeared in 115 BGE II 452, it becomes possible to clearly identify the nature
of the theoretical legal question involved in that ruling. There is no difficulty in
identifying the matter for referral in the conflict of laws rule adumbrated by the
Federal Supreme Court. The abstract question concerns the modalities for
terminating a lease that is in nexus with another agreementin this case, with a
collaboration agreement. Equally simple to identify are the potential leges
causae: either the statutory rules governing termination of a lease or those
governing termination of a collaboration agreement are applicable. In contrast,
more problematic is the term of reference used in the Federal Supreme Court’s
conflict of laws norm, the element of the norm that determines which of the two
potential leges causae should be applied in casuthe statute on leases (that is,
former CO Article 267a), or the statute specific to the collaboration agreement
70
(here, Article 5 of the contract).
This is, of course, not surprising. The choice of the “right” term of reference
has always been the most fervently debated issue on the “front lines of legal
71
policy” in modern conflict of laws theory and practice. As for 115 BGE II 452,
the considerations set forth in the ruling contain scarcely any indications that
would allow firm inferences as to the terms of reference underlying the Court’s
decision. Mention is made there only of the “legal” and “economic” significance
of the linked contracts, and of the “interdependence” that characterizes the
relationship between them. At the same time, there is an inference that the
69. See IVO SCHWANDER, EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT: ERSTER
BAND: ALLGEMEINER TEIL 70 (3d ed. 2000). See also GERHARD KEGEL & KLAUS SCHURIG,
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 262 (9th ed. 2004).
70. For more information on the structure of the term of reference, see CHRISTIAN VON BAR &
PETER MANKOWSKI, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT: ERSTER BAND: ALLGEMEINE LEHREN 454
(2d ed. 2003).
71. Rudolf Wiethölter, Book Review of Engel, Pierre, La détermination des point de rattachement
en droit international privé [Die Festlegung der Anknüpfungspunkte im internationalen Privatrecht].
Imprimerie Pezotti, Genf 1953. 158 S., 23 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 186 (1958). For a fundamental
discussion of the term of reference, see Robert Neuner, Die Anknüpfung im Internationalen
Privatrecht, 8 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 81 (1934); Hans G. Ficker, Verknüpfung von Anknüpfungen?, in 1
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS CARL NIPPERDEY ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 297–321 (Rolf Dietz & Heinz
Hübner eds., 1965); Werner Goldschmidt, Anknüpfungsanordnungen und Anknüpfungen: Ein
rechtstheoretischer und rechtspolitischer Versuch, in KONFLIKT UND ORDNUNG: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR
MURAD FERID 70. GEBURTSTAG 137–50 (Andreas Heldrich et al. eds., 1978); Fritz Schwind, Die
funktionelle Anknüpfung im IPR, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WOLFRAM MÜLLER-FREIENFELS 547–58
(Albrecht Dieckmann et al. eds., 1986).
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“economically most important agreement” in a group of affiliated contracts
should be seen as constituting the term of reference. This notion must, however,
be rejected, since the ultimate effect would be an analogous application of the
72
absorption doctrine to any and all legal issues arising in connection with
contractual networks. As will be discussed, it can hardly be seen as advisable
that the “most important” agreement should always take precedence, without
exception, over all other agreements with which it is affiliated. Such a rule
would be far too lacking in the refinement needed for doing justice to the
intricacies of the relationships created through contractual networks. In order
to extract a viable term of reference for the conflict of contracts rule applied in
115 BGE II 452, it is thus necessary to develop further the line of thought from
which its seeds can be discerned.
Here, it will be helpful first to recall the function of a term of reference in a
conflict of laws rule. With regard to private international law, Schwander has
provided a succinct description of that function:
The goal of a private international law conflict of laws rule is to indicate that criterion
that leads to a referral that is “adequate,” respectively . . . to each kindred group of
cases (such as effects of marriage, succession) to which there is a foreign aspect. What
is to be sought, therefore, is that term of reference by means of which plurinational
subject matters can be made subject to that national legal order thatfrom an abstract
and, as it73 were, supernational perspectiveis best suited for dealing with such subject
matters.

These observations hold true not only with regard to private international
law: they also make clear what, in essence, is needed from the term of reference
here being sought to complete the collision of contracts rule prefigured in 115
BGE II 452. The task that this term of reference must perform is to make
“pluricontractual” subject matters subject to the terms of that contract within
the contractual network that is best suited for dealing with that subject matter.
This then raises the question, of course, as to how, in concrete terms, this
task is to be performed. One possibility in seeking a response is to take
Schnitzer’s theory of functional reference as a point of departure: “Determinant
for the subsumption [of a legal relationship] is the function of that
relationship . . . , since a legal relationship orders rights and duties between
74
persons, which themselves must be ordered by their function.” Applied to
affiliated contracts, this would mean that the determinant for the subsumption
of the rights and duties of contractual parties to the terms of one contract within
a group of affiliated contracts would be the function of those rights and duties
within the contractual network as a whole. In other words, an “adequate”
referral criterion for articulating the collision of contracts rule arising out of 115
BGE II 452 would be the ability of the contractual network to function as such.

72. See supra Part II.
73. Schwander, supra note 69, at 78.
74. Adolf F. Schnitzer, Die funktionelle Anknüpfung im Internationalen Vertragsrecht, in
FESTGABE FÜR WILHELM SCHÖNENBERGER 397 (Rechts-, wirtschafts- und sozialwissenschaftliche
Fakultät der Universität Freiburg eds., 1968) (emphasis in the original).
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The purport of the rule would then be that the rights and duties in a contractual
network are subject to the provisions of that contract whose terms assure or
further the ability of that network to function in the concrete circumstances at
hand.
Obviously, this does not yet provide us, strictly speaking, with a term of
reference. It does, however, provide us with a rule of reference, a referential
guideline, or general clause, as it were, thatin contradistinction to traditional
terms of referencemust not only be construed in the light of the concrete
75
circumstances of each case, but also completed. Does it make sense for the
Swiss law of obligations to construct the missing collision of contracts rule on
the basis of such a “rule of reference?” Doing so would certainly be in keeping
with the essential nature of the contract as a legal instrument, the plasticity of
which makes it suitable for ordering the widest range of transactional
relationships. The prime difficulty, however, lies in arriving at a precise
understanding of the way each individual contractual network functions, and
defining the role of each individual right or duty.
A theoretical basis on which a method for making such determinations
could be built cannot be furnished here. It is nevertheless worth noting that in
76
the case of certain individual contractual relations, certain laws make use of
criteria based on network functions in order to resolve the subsumption
question as discussed here. This is of interest not only because these criteria
provide guidance in the concrete demarcation of the term of reference needed
for the law collision of contracts in connection with contractual networks, but
also because it demonstrates that the collision of contracts perspective
suggested here can be seamlessly incorporated into Swiss contract law, in
particular, as it in no way conflicts with the principle of private autonomy in
contracts—were it otherwise, this would presumably be the prime criticism of
77
the position argued in this article. It is, of course, not practical to deal
75. For more information on the structure of a rule of reference (in particular, as compared with
the classic notion of a term of reference), see Marc Amstutz, Nedim Peter Vogt & Markus Wang, Art.
112, 113, 116–118 IPRG, in BASLER KOMMENTAR: INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT N1, N6
(Heinrich Honsel et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007).
76. CO Art. 262, Para. 3, Sent. 2; CO Art. 268, Para. 2; CO Art. 291, Para. 3, Sent. 2; CO Art.
299c; CO Art., 399 Para. 3; and the Consumer Credit Act Art. 21.
77. A more detailed treatment of this question is not possible here. This much may, nevertheless,
be said: In classic legal theory, the principle of the mutual independence of contracts in contractual
networks is founded on the doctrines of privity of contract and freedom of contract. See Cerutti, supra
note 58, at 54 (providing a nearly paradigmatic example). In a punctilious study on subcontracting
agreements Chaix has demonstrated that adherence to this principle leads in many cases to
unsatisfactory solutions that are unacceptable for a modern private law regime. See Chaix, supra note
60, at 91. If the fundamental thesis here propounded is accepted, that is, that the differentiation of
society has confronted the law of contracts with the phenomenon of contract networks, for which the
traditional solutions of the law of obligations are no longer adequate, then new responses must be
developed. It must be kept in mind that these network constructions correspond to very real needs in
the real world, with which the legal system must be able to properly deal. See Walter R. Schluep,
Innominatverträge, in SCHWEIZERISCHES PRIVATRECHT: VOL. VII / 2: OBLIGATIONENRECHT:
BESONDERE VERTRAGSVERHÄLTNISSE 798 (Frank Vischer ed., 1979). A simple appeal to the doctrine
of freedom of contracts is obviously insufficient for dealing with an issue so complex.
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individually with each of the express norms in the laws just referenced. Instead,
two of them will be briefly discussed: CO Article 262, Paragraph 3, Sentence 2
and CO Article 399, Paragraph 2. These two provisions offer paradigmatic
examples of how specific constellations of circumstances can lead to a collision
of contracts.
CO Article 262, Paragraph 3, Sentence 2 provides that a landlord is entitled
to demand, both of a sublessor (his own tenant) and of a sublessee—with whom
he has no contractual link—that the property in question be used in a proper
78
manner, as set forth in the primary lease. Article 399, Paragraph 3 of the CO
foresees that, in cases of agency, where the agent delegates his authority to a
third party, whether to a substitute agent (as authorized by the principal) or to a
subagent (without such authorization), the principal is entitled to hold that third
party—with whom he has no contractual link—directly liable to himself for all
79
claims to which the agent is entitled. As Cerutti has noted, the two norms
share a common particularity, namely, “that they grant the principal only those
specific preferential rights that the legislator considers as crucial to the
80
respective subordinate contract.” The inference here is that the approach to
contractual networks in the Swiss law of contractsin keeping with the
viewpoint here advancedis not founded on an undifferentiated application of
the absorption doctrine in all cases where there is a conflict of contracts. On the
contrary, among the various issues that can arise in contractual networks, it is
only in certain very specific cases that they are addressed as “collision of
contracts” issues. The corollary question raised by Cerutti’s observation is then
this: What is the decisive criterion on the basis of which the law imposes crosscontractual rights and duties within a network of contracts?
Taking a closer look, first, at CO Article 262, Paragraph 3, Sentence 2, it is
conspicuous that although the landlord is permitted to demand directly that the
sublessee respect the terms of use as stipulated in the primary lease, the right to
81
demand payment of the rental fee is withheld. If one now considers the
question of the duty of care and maintenance, as arises in connection with all
82
rental agreements, the purpose of this rule, as far as the functioning of the
contractual network is concerned, is clear. The nature of the affiliation between
the parties to a series of leases and subleases, as a network of contracts between
parties with opposing interests, is such that it cannot give rise to a commonality

78. See Peter Higi, Art. 253–265 OR, in KOMMENTAR ZUM SCHWEIZERISCHEN
ZIVILGESETZBUCH: OBLIGATIONENRECHT, TEILBD. V / 2B: DIE MIETE 664 N 27 (Peter Gauch ed.,
1994).
79. Compare Walter Fellmann, Art. 394–406 OR, in BERNER KOMMENTAR: DAS
OBLIGATIONENRECHT, BD. VI / 2. ABT. / 4. TEILBD: DER EINFACHE AUFTRAG N 610 (Heinz
Hausheer ed., 1992), with Art. 399 N 92.
80. See Cerutti, supra note 58, at 39. In both cases, a so-called coupling agreement is absent. See
also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
81. See Cerutti, supra note 58, at 39. See also Chaix, supra note 60, at 205–6.
82. For more on the duty of care and maintenance, see JOSEF ESSER & HANS-LEO WEYERS,
Schuldrecht, BD. II: BESONDERER TEIL, TEILBD. 1: VERTRÄGE 130 (8th ed. 1998).

11_AMSTUTZ_BP (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2013]

8/16/2013 10:52 AM

CONTRACT COLLISIONS

187

of financial interests—it is not a “rental partnership” of any kind. In order for
such a construct to function at all, however, it is of crucial importance that the
rental object be maintained in a serviceable condition, and the judge of whether
that is the case (in keeping with what is still the prevailing foundational
principle of a free market society) is the landlord, as the owner of the property.
Accordingly, CO Article 262, Paragraph 3, Sentence 2 seeks to ensure that the
incentive for maintaining the substance of the rental object is distributed
throughout the entire network. It does this by allowing the prime generator of
that incentiveproperty ownershipto extend its effects to all parties
contractually bound within the network.
A different rationalethough also network relatedunderlies CO Article
83
399, Paragraph 3. Agency and other agreements for the provision of services
are, insofar as the performance to be delivered by the agent or service provider
84
is concerned, generally characterized by a notable lack of precision. This is a
natural consequence of the fact that the service provider is normally a highly
qualified specialist—for example, a patent attorney or heart surgeon—so that it
is often impossible for the principal to state the desired performance in precise
terms, since he lacks the expertise needed to do so. In order to counterbalance
this precision deficit, appeal is made to a blanket contractual obligation of
performance in the interests of the principal, understood as a duty of means to
safeguard those interests. When the authority granted to the agent or service
provider is then further delegated to a third party, the level of imprecision is
raised exponentially, since the substitute or subagent has no direct duty of any
85
kind towards the principal. The cure provided by CO Article 399, Paragraph 2
86
consists of providing for a network-wide recourse mechanism : there is a
redistribution of incentives by granting the principal a direct liability claim
against the substituted third party for enforcement of the duties arising from the
subordinate contract. All of the parties affiliated through the network of
delegated authorityand, specifically the substitute—thereby have an
inducement to share, to the greatest possible degree, the objective of
87
safeguarding the principal’s interests.
83. The teleological issue with regard to CO Article 399, Paragraph 3 has not yet received a proper
treatment in the Swiss legal scholarship. See Chaix, supra note 60, at 234. Compare Fellmann, supra
note 79, at Art. 399 N 93, with Cerutti, supra note 58, at 45, and PETER DERENDINGER, DIE NICHTUND DIE NICHT RICHTIGE ERFÜLLUNG DES EINFACHEN AUFTRAGES 146f (1988); JOSEF
HOFSTETTER, Der Auftrag und die Geschäftsführung ohne Auftrag, in SCHWEIZERISCHES
PRIVATRECHT: BD. VII / 6: OBLIGATIONENRECHT – BESONDERE VERTRAGSVERHÄLTNISSE, 98
(Wolfgang Wiegand ed., 2000).
84. See FRANZ WERRO, LE MANDAT ET SES EFFETS: UNE ETUDE SUR LE CONTRAT D’ACTIVITE
INDEPENDANTE SELON LE CODE SUISSE DES OBLIGATIONS: ANALYSE CRITIQUE ET COMPARATIVE
192–210 (1993).
85. Id. at 191.
86. See Fellmann, supra note 79, at Art. 399 N 618.
87. See Chaix, supra note 60, at 237. This teleological orientation is clearly recognizable in the
Federal Supreme Court’s (correct) finding in 110 BGE II 186–87, that the rights foreseen in CO Article
399, Paragraph 3 also comprehend the right of withdrawal pursuant CO Article 404. Id. at 209. For a
wrongly critical critique (based on a dubious line of reasoning), see Fellmann, supra note 79, at Art. 399
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This “network-functional” construction of CO Article 262, Paragraph 3,
Sentence 2 and CO Article 399, Paragraph 2 opens the way to a
conceptualization of these norms as objective collision-of-contracts norms, in
keeping with the model argued here as having being adumbrated by 115 BGE II
452, and for considering possibilities for a more general deployment of the
principle applied in that ruling by the Federal Supreme Court as here
88
understood. Both CO Article 262, Paragraph 3, Sentence 2 and CO Article
399, Paragraph 2 take as their term of reference (or, more precisely, as grounds
of referral) the capacity of the contractual network to perform its function. At
the same time, however, the concrete manner in which this general term of
reference is to be applied is variable and depends upon the specific modus
operandi of a given contractual network or of a given category of contractual
networks. CO Article 262, Paragraph 3, Sentence 2 seeks to extend the scope of
the principal’s rights of ownership as “anchored” in the primary lease
throughout the entire nexus of leases. In contrast, the aim of CO Article 399,
Paragraph 2 is to reconnect the agency or service performance obligations of a
substituted third party, as anchored in the subordinate contract, with the
primary function of safeguarding the principal’s interests.
The formulation of the individual provisions is, accordingly, adapted to
those concrete objectives. CO Article 262, Paragraph 3, Sentence 2 makes the
duties of the debtor (the sublessee) subject to the terms of a contract to which
the debtor is not formally a party (the primary lease). Conversely, CO Article
399, Paragraph 2 makes the rights of the creditor (the principal) enforceable
under the terms of a contract (the substitution agreement) to which the creditor
89
is not formally a party. This “modulation” of the term of reference makes it
possible for those whose task it is to apply the respective norms to subsume the
matter for referral in each case under the “adequate” contractual regime.
Though it is not possible to go further into the question here, it may be assumed
that these norms furnish two of the possible paradigms for collision-of-contracts
rules whose practical potential reaches far beyond the scope of leasing or
agency agreements.

N 103. For critical remarks worthy of more serious consideration, see Cerutti, supra note 58, at 40, 119f120.
88. The question of a more general applicability arises in connection with the fact that the
statutory provisions mentioned have left the realm of bilateral agreements (as dealt with in 115 BGE II
452) and entered that of trilateral agreements, where there are three different contractual parties
involved.
89. Fellmann fails to do justice to the fundamental difference between the structure of CO Article
262, Paragraph 3, Sentence 2 and that of CO Article 399, Paragraph 3, when he states that in both cases
a “unilaterally grounded obligation” is created. Supra note 79, at Art. 399 N 97. By contrast, Chaix
distinguishes in the same manner as here argued, between the “effets négatifs du contrat” and the
“effets positifs du contrat.” Supra note 60, at 185.
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IV
CONCLUSION
Whether the theoretical construct of an objective collision-of-contracts law,
as sketched in the foregoing, merits further development is a question that the
future and, more specifically, the academic debate, will decideinsofar as it is
willing even to enter into a discourse on the issue. In my view, the collision-ofcontracts perspective provides a highly promising method for comprehending
contractual networks within a legal regime for two reasons: not only because it
offers a highly sensitive tool for deciding questions of referral, but also because
it is principle based and should thus make it possible to avoid the need for
perpetually improvised, ad hoc decisions. This then leaves us with a final
question, namely, whether the development of a theory of contractual networks
is, in the absolute sense, something even to be desired. In any case, for those of
us with a preference for “timeless law,” for a “law in its own time,” there is little
doubt on the matterfor, as von Jhering famously reminded us, esse sequitur
90
operari.

90. RUDOLF V. JHERING, VORGESCHICHTE DER INDOEUROPÄER 96 (1894).

